0.0
April 22, 2018, Dubai International Airport, a detention
5.08
room.
6.24
A 51-year-old woman named Hanan Elater
9.06
is being held by United Arab Emirates authorities.
12.259
She is a flight attendant, a senior supervisor
14.779
at a major international airline.
16.78
She is also the wife of a Saudi
18.539
journalist named Jamal Khashoggi.
20.739
Her devices have been taken into official custody.
23.899
Her phones are sitting on a desk somewhere
26.8
out of her sight in the possession of
28.96
UAE security personnel.
32.2
At 10.014 in the morning, an unidentified
35.479
UAE official picks up one of her Android
37.92
phones.
39.0
The official opens the Chrome browser.
41.359
The official types a URL into the address
43.899
bar, fumbling over the small keys, making two
47.1
typos along the way, then pressing go.
49.84
The address is a Pegasus infection link.
52.5
The website was constructed.
53.899
The website was constructed specifically for the UAE
55.56
government's NSO Group account.
57.56
It exists for one purpose, to silently install
60.56
surveillance software on a target's phone.
63.679
Over the next 40 seconds, the phone sends
66.26
27 status reports back to the UAE operator's
69.599
server, updating the progress of installing the spyware.
73.459
The total compromise process takes 72 seconds.
78.659
Hanan Elater does not know any of this
81.299
is happening.
82.0
She is in a separate room.
83.319
She is being interrogated about her husband.
85.659
She will not learn what was done to
87.879
her phone for another three years.
90.04
Six months later, on October 2, 2018, Hanan
93.859
Elater's husband walks into the Saudi consulate in
96.7
Istanbul to retrieve documents he needs for his
99.319
upcoming wedding.
100.34
His Turkish fiancée, Hatice Kengiz, waits outside.
104.299
He never comes out.
106.079
A 15-member squad of Saudi operatives, several
109.7
closely connected to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman,
112.7
has flown to the Saudi consulate.
115.72
They strangle him inside the Saudi consulate.
118.2
They dismember his body.
119.859
They dispose of the remains in a way
122.12
that has never been publicly recovered.
124.28
The Turkish government, which has secretly bugged the
127.14
Saudi consulate, captures audio of the murder.
131.819
This case file is not about the assassination
134.28
itself.
135.4
That has been documented elsewhere.
138.14
This case file is about what was done
140.58
in the months before.
141.819
He entered the consulate.
143.28
About a piece of software developed by a
146.02
small Israeli company.
147.36
About the people who built it.
149.08
About the governments that bought it.
150.879
And about the institutional mechanism that, more than
153.68
seven years later, has still not produced full
156.24
accountability for what it has been used to
158.099
do.
158.9
The software is called Pegasus.
161.599
The company is called NSO Group.
164.319
This is the case file.
166.599
NSO Group was founded in 2010 by three
169.78
Israelis.
170.599
Niv Carmi, Shalev Julio, Omri Yadav.
173.28
The company name is constructed from their initials.
176.68
All three were alumni of the Israel Defense
179.36
Forces.
180.379
Carmi had served in both military intelligence and
182.9
the Mossad.
183.68
Julio served as a major in the IDF's
186.08
search and rescue unit.
187.34
The institutional lineage that mattered most ran through
190.62
Unit 8200, the elite signals intelligence unit of
194.06
the IDF, often described as the foremost technical
196.74
intelligence agency in the world.
198.96
Unit 8200 is the Israeli analog to the
202.199
U.S.
202.699
National Security Service.
203.28
Its alumni, variously estimated at tens of thousands
207.86
of veterans by 2026, have founded a substantial
210.819
fraction of Israel's cybersecurity industry.
213.74
NSO Group's research and development team has been
216.419
described, in multiple sources, as composed almost entirely
219.84
of former Unit 8200 personnel.
222.259
The most elite Unit 8200 training program, called
226.199
ARAM, accepts only a handful of recruits and
229.34
trains them in advanced cyberweapons programming.
231.68
NSO Group's most valuable employees are reportedly graduates
235.78
of ARAM and similar elite programs.
240.439
The founder's public origin story, primarily as told
244.08
by Julio in numerous interviews, runs as follows.
247.479
In the late 2000s, Julio and Levy founded
250.9
a company called CommuniTake.
252.5
It provided remote phone troubleshooting for cellular operators,
256.019
software that allowed support technicians to remotely access
259.379
and operate customer phones to diagnose and detect
261.66
the threat.
264.339
Julio has said in subsequent interviews, an unnamed
267.98
European intelligence agency contacted them.
270.68
The agency had a problem.
272.519
Encryption was making it impossible to read communications
275.5
from targets they were lawfully authorized to surveil.
278.66
The agency was interested in CommuniTake's remote access
281.839
technology.
282.779
Could it be repurposed?
284.759
Julio and Levy recognized the opportunity.
287.54
They brought in Niv Carmi for his Mossad
290.199
and military intelligence background.
291.639
In 2010, they founded NSO Group.
295.439
The product they developed they named Pegasus.
298.279
The pricing structure of Pegasus, documented through court
301.66
filings and subsequent litigation, was approximately as follows.
305.24
$500,000 in setup fees.
308.54
$650,000 per 10 simultaneous target devices for
312.68
iOS, similar pricing for Android.
315.24
Unlimited targeting tiers up to approximately $40 million
318.699
for full-spectrum government deployment.
321.019
And $1,000,000 in software.
321.639
These prices placed Pegasus within institutional reach of
325.519
any national intelligence service.
327.6
They explain why the customer base was exclusively
330.56
governments.
331.68
The company's stated position, repeated in virtually every
335.48
press response, was that Pegasus was sold only
338.779
to vetted government customers for use in fighting
341.42
terrorism and serious crime.
343.839
The actual customer behavior, documented by independent researchers
348.019
over the following decade, was different.
350.339
Beginning in approximately 2016, a research group at
355.04
the University of Toronto, called Citizen Lab, began
358.66
documenting individual cases of Pegasus deployment.
362.04
The principal investigator was a researcher named Bill
365.319
Martzak.
366.079
His methodology was forensic.
368.04
When activists, journalists, or dissidents reported anomalous phone
371.699
behavior, Martzak would conduct technical analysis of their
375.1
devices, looking for indicators of Pegasus presence.
377.899
The case-by-case findings, accumulated over five
381.879
years, established a pattern.
384.54
Mexico.
385.68
The Mexican government had been one of NSO
388.0
Group's earliest clients, signing a $20 million contract
391.0
in 2012.
392.66
Citizen Lab subsequently identified Pegasus deployments against Mexican
396.579
investigative journalists who had been reporting on government
399.259
corruption, including reporters working on the disappearance of
402.42
43 students in Iguala in 2014.
405.06
One of the Mexican journalists targeted Cecilio Alonso.
407.879
Cecilio Pineda Berto was assassinated by gunmen at
410.379
a car wash in March 2017, weeks after
413.139
his phone number had been added to the
414.699
Pegasus targeting list.
415.98
The United Arab Emirates.
418.579
Documented use against women's rights activists, including Lujain
422.819
al-Hathloul, who was abducted in 2018 and
426.579
returned to Saudi Arabia for arrest and torture.
429.98
Bahrain.
431.6
Pegasus deployed against journalists, human rights activists, and
435.5
diss Guard.
441.22
Saudi Arabia.
443.16
The most prolific user.
444.8
Cases extending across years.
448.4
By summer 2018, Citizen Lab had documented compromises
453.48
in Khashoggi's immediate circle.
455.639
Omar Abdulaziz, a Saudi dissident blogger living in
459.42
exile in Canada, was Khashoggi's primary collaborator on
462.959
Saudi opposition projects.
464.6
The two men had been used to create
466.019
a series of
466.04
social media campaigns to counter Saudi state social
469.5
media propaganda.
471.1
Abdulaziz's phone was infected with Pegasus in summer
474.18
2018.
475.139
The infection was attributed by Citizen Lab, with
478.199
high confidence, to an operator linked to Saudi
480.879
Arabia's government and security services.
483.62
The Citizen Lab report on Abdulaziz was published
487.399
on October 1, 2018.
489.86
One day later, Khashoggi entered the Saudi consulate
493.319
in Istanbul.
494.5
The technical fact of the matter.
496.04
The outcome of the case is uncontested.
497.699
For approximately four months before Khashoggi's murder, the
501.019
Saudi government had real-time access to every
503.54
WhatsApp message exchanged between him and his closest
506.879
collaborator.
508.16
Khashoggi believed his communications were private.
510.939
They were not.
513.44
The forensic analysis of Hadak Singhas' phone, conducted
517.12
as part of the subsequent Pegasus Project investigation,
520.2
confirmed that her phone, too, was compromised by
523.32
Pegasus during the days surrounding the murder.
525.46
She was waiting outside the consulate.
528.2
Her communications were being read.
530.0
The forensic analysis of Hanan Ilacr's phone, conducted
533.74
by Bill Martzak and published by The Washington
536.86
Post in December 2021, established that the 72
540.799
-second installation that had occurred in Dubai airport
543.559
six months before the assassination had been a
546.559
UAE government deployment of Pegasus, manually installed during
550.539
her detention.
551.62
NSO Group's response to evidence of Pegasus' role
555.059
in the murder was not clear.
555.44
The investigation into the Khashoggi case was consistent.
557.559
In March 2019, NSO Group CEO Shalev Julio
561.899
appeared on the US television program 60 Minutes.
565.32
The interviewer was Leslie Stahl.
567.82
Julio looked her in the eye.
569.559
He said NSO had checked its records and
572.2
confirmed that NSO technology had not been used
575.259
on Khashoggi or his relatives.
576.94
He said the company had nothing to do
578.899
with what he called the horrible murder.
581.36
In July 2021, when the Pegasus Project investigation
584.659
was published, the company's investigation was not complete.
585.419
Julio repeated the denial.
587.34
He told the Israeli technology publication Calculus that
590.519
NSO had checked and that Hanan Ilacr was
593.08
not a target.
593.98
He said there are no traces of Pegasus
596.74
on her phone because she was not a
598.44
target.
599.0
In December 2021, The Washington Post published Martzak's
603.58
forensic analysis showing that Ilacr's phone had in
606.559
fact been targeted manually by a UAE operator.
610.86
NSO's attorney Thomas Clare responded that the Post's
614.32
reporting was deeply misleading.
615.419
He said that the Post's reporting was deeply
615.6
flawed and that the technical details made no
618.12
sense from a technical standpoint.
620.179
He claimed, Pegasus is installed only remotely and
624.08
that the manual installation described in the forensic
626.6
analysis was therefore implausible.
630.74
The forensic record contradicted this.
633.659
Martzak's analysis documented the specific sequence of typed
637.36
characters.
638.039
The URL constructed for the UAE client's Pegasus
641.74
instance.
642.399
The typos the UAE operator had made on
645.22
the phone.
645.419
The phone's keyboard.
646.259
And the 27 status reports the phone had
648.74
sent back to the server during installation.
651.259
The denial pattern across the Khashoggi case file
654.32
has, on the documentary record, been demonstrated to
657.62
be inconsistent with the forensic evidence.
660.48
In 2020, a list of approximately 50,000
664.279
phone numbers leaked to a Paris-based journalism
666.48
nonprofit called Forbidden Stories and to Amnesty International.
671.379
The list was believed to be a roster
673.62
of targets selected by Amnesty International.
675.399
The list was not identified by the NSO
675.759
Group's government clients.
677.059
It spanned at least 50 countries.
679.559
It dated back to approximately 2016.
682.919
The source of the leak has not been
685.019
publicly identified.
686.5
Forbidden Stories, founded by the journalist Laurent Richard,
689.779
has historically focused on continuing the work of
692.7
murdered journalists.
693.98
The Daphne Project, following the assassination of Maltese
697.519
journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia in 2017.
701.24
The Cartel Project, following Mexican drug cartel-related
704.899
murders.
705.379
The pattern was the same, continuing the work
708.48
that organized actors had attempted to silence.
711.379
This investigation became the Pegasus Project.
715.2
Forbidden Stories invited 16 additional media organizations to
719.419
join.
719.94
The Washington Post, The Guardian, Esquimaldic, and Radio
723.899
France, Die Zeitung, and Esquidosh Zeitung, Frontline, PBS,
728.5
Haaretz 16, Indian, Mexican, Hungarian, Belgian, Syrian, and
733.419
other regional outlets.
734.539
Eighty plus journalists worked on the project.
737.019
The technical analysis worked on the project.
739.34
The technical analysis was conducted by Amnesty International's
742.82
Security Lab.
744.32
The Pegasus Project's reporting began publication on July
747.62
18th, 2021.
749.68
The findings were specific.
751.7
The leaked list included at least 180 journalists
754.799
across 20 countries, working for outlets including Agence
758.34
France, Press, Al Jazeera, Associated Press, CNN, The
762.879
Economist, Allmond, Darwin, video.
765.44
Diexdaxdaxdaxdaxd, Le Mondeck, The New York Times, Reuters,
768.82
The Wall Street Journal, and Voice of
770.58
America.
771.2
At least 10 governments appear to have submitted
773.72
names to the targeting list.
775.24
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Mexico, Hungary,
780.039
India, Rwanda, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan.
783.279
The targets included human rights defenders, lawyers, opposition
787.539
politicians, business leaders,
789.48
diplomats, union leaders, and several heads of state.
793.24
The phone number of French President
795.159
Emmanuel Macron was on the list.
798.019
Forensic analysis of 67 of the targeted phones
801.379
found 37 with traces
802.94
of Pegasus activity.
804.399
23 confirmed infections.
806.779
14 attempted infections.
810.08
The named targets included
812.44
Khadija Ismailova, an award-winning Azerbaijani investigative journalist.
818.12
Sibok Spanyi,
819.48
a Hungarian investigative reporter whose phone was compromised
822.34
for seven months in 2019.
824.84
Siddharth Varadarajan, founder of the Indian news site
828.34
The Wire.
829.24
Omar Radi, a Moroccan investigative
831.48
journalist subsequently imprisoned.
833.72
Anand Teltumde, an Indian human rights defender
836.759
subsequently imprisoned.
838.679
Edwi Plenel, founder of the French investigative outlet
841.74
Media Part.
842.899
Hatice Kengis, Hanan Elatour, Lujain Al-Hathloul, Princess
847.82
Latifa, daughter of the
849.36
ruler of Dubai.
851.139
Approximately 40 Indian journalists were on the list,
854.24
suggesting Indian government use
856.019
of Pegasus despite official denials.
859.44
President Emmanuel Macron of France.
862.379
The President of France
863.919
was on a list of phone numbers that
865.559
an unidentified NSO client had selected for surveillance.
869.439
The institutional response was substantial.
872.399
In November 2021, the Biden administration placed
876.2
NSO Group on the U.S.
878.08
Department of Commerce,
879.36
entity list, severely restricting NSO's access to U
883.279
.S.
883.539
technology and U.S.
884.96
business relationships.
886.22
The designation was widely interpreted as a national
889.659
security determination.
891.2
The U.S.
892.139
government had concluded that NSO Group's activities were
895.34
contrary
895.84
to U.S.
896.779
foreign policy interests.
898.34
The European Parliament established a committee of inquiry
901.96
on Pegasus and equivalent spyware to investigate use
906.2
of commercial surveillance technology by EU
909.0
members.
909.34
The European Parliament established a committee of inquiry
909.34
on Pegasus and equivalent spyware to investigate use
909.34
of commercial surveillance technology by EU members.
909.36
The European Parliament established a committee of inquiry
910.94
on Pegasus and equivalent spyware to investigate use
910.94
of commercial surveillance technology by EU members.
910.94
The committee's final report, in 2023, documented Pegasus
914.58
deployments by Hungarian,
916.1
Polish, Spanish, and other EU governments against opposition
920.0
politicians and journalists.
922.279
Israel's Defense Ministry tightened export restrictions, reducing the
926.399
list of countries
927.139
to which Israeli surveillance companies could sell from
929.779
102 to 37.
932.54
Spain's intelligence agency, CNI, saw the resignation of
936.759
its director, Paz Esteban, after the
939.179
the country's intelligence agency, CNI, saw the resignation
939.34
of its director, Paz Esteban, after the
939.34
the country's intelligence agency, CNI, saw the resignation
939.919
of its director, Paz Esteban, after the
939.919
scandal in which dozens of Catalan independence leaders
942.679
had been targeted with Pegasus.
944.779
Mexico initiated investigations and prosecutions against former officials
949.96
who had purchased Pegasus.
953.259
The most consequential single legal action was filed
956.179
by WhatsApp.
957.36
In May 2019, WhatsApp had identified a vulnerability
960.759
in its application
961.919
that NSO had been exploiting to deliver Pegasus
964.899
to over 1,400 WhatsApp users globally, including
968.639
journalists, human rights activists, and political dissidents.
972.399
WhatsApp filed suit in October 29 in the
975.139
US District Court for the Northern District of
977.299
California.
978.059
The case took five years.
980.779
NSO Group attempted multiple defenses, foreign sovereign immunity,
985.12
on the grounds that NSO should be treated
987.36
as an agent of a foreign government.
989.24
The District Court rejected this in 2020.
991.919
The 9th Circuit affirmed, the US Supreme Court
994.899
declined to hear NSO's appeal in January 2023.
998.639
Foreign Law Restrictions on Discovery On the grounds
1001.399
that Israeli law prevented
1002.62
NSO from producing source code, Judge Phyllis Hamilton
1005.779
ruled in November 2023 that the foreign
1008.519
law claims did not excuse NSO's discovery obligations.
1012.299
Personnel Jurisdiction Records released in November 2024
1016.419
revealed that NSO used U.S.-based technology, including
1019.919
AWN.
1020.779
On December 20, 2024, Judge Hamilton issued summary
1025.44
judgment finding NSO Group liable on all
1028.44
court Göran D Boysson, the US Supreme Court,
1028.619
a voluntary statement submitted.
1028.64
claims.
1029.059
It was the first U.S.
1030.839
court decision establishing NSO Group's liability for Pegasus
1034.619
-related
1034.839
conduct.
1035.74
A jury trial on damages was held in
1038.539
spring 2025.
1040.059
On May 6, 2025, the jury awarded
1043.5
WhatsApp $444,000 in statutory damages and $167
1049.2
.25 million in punitive damages.
1052.66
Total,
1053.42
approximately $168 million.
1058.259
In a parallel case, Apple had filed suit
1061.059
against NSO Group in November
1062.7
2021.
1063.779
In September 2024, Apple voluntarily dismissed its case.
1068.14
The reasoning, articulated
1069.66
in court filings, continuing the litigation, would require
1073.119
disclosure of details about Apple's
1075.099
security infrastructure that could hamper its efforts to
1077.7
fight spyware.
1078.539
Apple argued that the
1079.94
commercial spyware market had expanded substantially since 2021.
1083.42
With multiple competitors entering the space, and that
1086.519
even complete victory in the Apple case
1088.4
would not have the systemic impact it would
1090.559
have had three years earlier.
1092.24
The Apple withdrawal was
1094.059
widely interpreted as a strategic loss and as
1097.279
evidence of NSO Group's success in using Discovery
1099.96
as a weapon against plaintiffs whose litigation could
1103.0
expose internal security operations.
1106.019
Pegasus is the most documented commercial spyware product.
1109.559
It is not the only one.
1111.7
By 2026,
1113.42
the commercial spyware industry included at least PECTOR
1116.64
developed by the Intellexa Consortium,
1118.9
a multinational network of companies based in Greece,
1121.98
Cyprus, Hungary, North Macedonia,
1124.519
and Israel, founded by former IDF Intelligence Officer
1128.059
Tal Dillion.
1129.299
The U.S.
1130.38
Treasury added Intellexa entities to the Ofac sanctions
1133.4
list in March 2024.
1136.319
Candiru, an Israeli company specializing in Windows-based
1139.9
exploitation,
1140.94
added to the U.S.
1142.299
Commerce Entity list, foreign cropping systems, and broken
1143.4
backstory.
1143.4
alongside NSO Group in November 2021.
1147.72
Quadream, founded by former NSO employees, developed REI
1151.779
Gene, a similar product to Pegasus,
1154.059
officially shut down in April 2023 after Citizen
1157.38
Lab and Microsoft Threat Intelligence reporting.
1160.46
Hacking Team, the Italian vendor, breached and exposed
1163.819
in July 2015 by an anonymous hacker
1166.66
called Phineas Fisher.
1168.059
Gamma Group, the Anglo-German makers of Phineas
1172.019
Fisher, breached by Phineas Fisher in 2014,
1175.66
filed for insolvency in 2022 amid German criminal
1180.0
investigation.
1182.56
The post-Pegasus generation of commercial spyware vendors
1186.279
has continued operations.
1188.279
The market that NSO Group pioneered has not
1191.88
disappeared.
1192.859
It has fragmented across more vendors, more jurisdictions,
1196.599
and more sophisticated vendors.
1198.059
It has fragmented corporate structures designed to better
1200.18
resist accountability mechanisms.
1202.77
In October 2025, NSO Group itself confirmed that
1207.24
a group of U.S.-based investors led by
1209.619
film producer Robert Simons had acquired controlling interest
1212.98
in the company.
1213.92
The implications of the ownership transition, whether it
1217.039
indicates regulatory rehabilitation,
1219.299
full transition to U.S.
1220.859
operations, or some other structural change, are unresolved
1224.44
as of April 2026.
1226.539
NSO Group continues to work on the issue.
1228.059
The stock market continues to sell Pegasus.
1229.14
The institutional response, real and substantial, has materially
1233.599
damaged the company.
1234.779
It has not stopped the industry.
1237.299
Fragment Zero has tracked one principle across the
1240.46
case files of the past several months.
1243.16
The Stuxnet case, foundational to the Channel Arc,
1246.259
demonstrated that state actors could
1248.359
build cyberweapons capable of physical destruction at industrial
1251.839
scale.
1252.9
The doctrine, silence, patience, asymmetric capability exercised when
1257.94
the industry was
1258.039
the strategic calculus favors it, was first proven
1260.759
by the United States and Israel against
1263.059
the Iranian nuclear program between 2006 and 2010.
1267.519
The Pegasus case demonstrates the next step.
1270.979
The capability has been commodified.
1273.46
The technology developed by Unit A200 alumni,
1276.819
substantively the same institutional capability that built Stuxnet,
1281.2
has been productized,
1282.599
priced, and sold to client governments that lack
1285.24
the technical capacity to develop such
1287.259
tools themselves.
1288.38
Any government with $40 million can have what
1291.44
previously required NSA or Unit A200
1294.119
institutional capacity to build.
1296.319
This is the commercial dark forest.
1298.779
The Lucy-Chin doctrine,
1300.48
revelation as existential hazard, asymmetric capability exercised when
1305.099
the strategic
1305.559
calculus favors it, applies not just to states
1308.539
observing other states, it applies to commercial
1310.9
entities selling the asymmetric capability to whoever can
1314.5
afford it.
1316.759
The commercial dark forest is the commercial dark
1317.24
forest.
1317.24
The Khashoggi case is the clearest single illustration.
1320.539
Khashoggi could not communicate
1321.96
privately with his closest collaborator.
1324.16
He believed he could.
1325.5
He used end-to-end encrypted
1327.599
applications.
1328.66
He used best practice operational security.
1331.579
None of it mattered because his
1333.079
collaborator's phone was compromised at the operating system
1336.24
level by a piece of software
1337.94
that had been sold to the Saudi government
1339.68
by an Israeli company founded by Unit A200
1342.5
alumni.
1343.839
The information asymmetry was complete.
1347.24
The strategic advantage was exercised.
1349.599
The consequences propagated independently of
1352.48
Khashoggi's subsequent decisions.
1354.4
In the language of Fragment Zero's previous case
1357.48
files, he could not
1358.759
unreveal what he had already revealed.
1361.24
The operation that exploited the revelation had already
1364.599
executed.
1366.92
The institutional response, the U.S.
1370.0
Commerce Entity List, the WhatsApp $168 million judgment,
1374.74
the EU PEGA Committee, the Israeli-Israeli Union,
1377.22
and the Israeli-Israeli Union.
1377.22
The Israeli Defense Ministry export restrictions is real.
1380.16
It is also late.
1381.559
By the time these
1382.74
mechanisms engaged, NSO Group had already deployed Pegasus
1386.72
against approximately 50,000
1388.799
documented targets.
1390.24
The harms to those targets—imprisonment, exile, assassination, divorce,
1396.059
professional
1396.599
destruction, family separation—had already occurred.
1400.779
Hanan Elater, who was a senior airline
1403.359
supervisor flying internationally, was working a low-wage
1407.079
relationship with the Israeli-Israeli
1407.22
company for nearly a month and a half,
1416.359
and his growth had continued.
1419.14
Looking over the past year million treats, thedens
1420.5
of men are seeing rallying faces,
1427.9
politicians bribingwheels, vindicators, and originals being lynched on
1431.38
a
1431.38
gutting shrine for the evil appelling of have
1431.38
-beens.
1437.22
Saudi security officials.
1438.64
The five sentenced to death were low-level
1441.599
participants and were
1442.779
pardoned by Khashoggi's children in May 2020.
1445.88
The case file does not close.
1448.559
What can be established
1449.839
is the precedent.
1451.46
Pegasus is the foundational commercial case.
1454.039
Predator, the next planned
1455.72
fragment zero case file, is the second.
1458.099
The third, fourth, fifth cases are presumably in
1461.46
development
1461.799
right now, built by founders learning from NSO's
1464.92
regulatory missteps, structuring corporate
1467.279
entities to better resist sovereign immunity rejections, pricing
1470.98
their products to evade
1472.38
entity, list thresholds, finding clients in jurisdictions where
1476.18
Israeli, U.S., and EU
1477.759
regulators have less leverage.
1479.779
The capability that built Stuxnet was state.
1482.92
The capability
1483.759
that built Pegasus was commercial.
1485.94
The capability that builds the next product line
1488.64
will be whatever
1489.559
the regulatory environment of the moment makes it.
1491.799
In the months before he was murdered, Jamal
1497.039
Khashoggi believed his communications were
1499.079
private.
1499.68
His government read them anyway.
1501.799
The technology that allowed this had been
1504.359
built by veterans of one country's intelligence service
1507.099
and sold to another country's government
1509.2
for approximately $40 million per full-spectrum deployment.
1513.779
The technology continues to operate.
1516.559
The market continues to grow.
1518.48
The case file does not close.
1522.62
Fragment zero will track the case file.
1525.299
The case file does not close.
1527.44
It waits.
